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Warren: Montana's Rule On Res Gestae

MONTANA'S RULE ON RES GESTAE
John S. Warren
INTRODUCTION
To be admissible, it is a general rule that all evidence must be
both relevant and competent. Hearsay evidence 1 is excluded because
it is thought to be untrustworthy and, therefore, incompetent. The
main justifications for suspicion of hearsay evidence have been: (1) the
out-of-court asserter was not under oath; (2) the jury is unable to
observe the out-of-court asserter's demeanor; (3) the witness may have
somehow misunderstood the out-of-court asserter's statement; and (4)
the opposing party has no opportunity to cross-examine the out-ofcourt asserter. Logically, should the offered hearsay testimony be inherently trustworthy, and should the justifications just enumerated
suggest no reason for excluding the offered evidence, then relevant
hearsay evidence should be admissible.
Predictively, no sooner was the rule against hearsay evidence
established, but exceptions sprouted up. One such exception has been
known as res gestae, or "things done."'2 It is commonly thought of as
being a set of connected acts which, when taken as a whole, comprise
a complete transaction forming the subject of litigation. Since the
res gestae rule's creation, courts have often carelessly bandied it about,
sometimes applying it correctly as an exception to the exclusionary
hearsay rule, and othertimes using it wrongly as a standard of relevance.
To an extent, the literal meaning of the phrase "res gestae" is responsible
for its misuse; hence, the rule has been criticized as "a convenient substitute for analysis," 3 and as "not only entirely useless, but even posi'4
tively harmful."
In an attempt to clarify the hazy definition of res gestae, many
jurisdictions have sought to analyze it by subdividing according to its
many chimerical characteristics. Spontaneous declarations, verbal acts,
expressions of a state of mind, expressions of physical condition, irrelevant facts which are inseparable from relevant ones, words constituting
circumstantial evidence, and words involved in the pleadings are the
most often encountered subdivisions. The Montana supreme court has
'McCormick offers the best definition of hearsay evidence:

"Hearsay evidence is
testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of the matters asserted therein,
and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter.''
C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 246 (2d ed. 1972).
'The earliest reference Professor Wigmore found to "res gestae"' was in The Ship
Money Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 988 (1637). J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLOAMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE, § 1767, n. 1 (3d ed. 1923). However, the res gestae

exception to the hearsay rule has been firmly established only since the mid-1800's.
Id. § 1768.

'Spencer, Res Gestae in Oregon, 11 OR. L. REV. 254, 254 (1932).
'WIoMORE, supra note 2 at § 1767.
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not pursued this course. While often borrowing terminology from the
lexicon developed by those jurisdictions which subdivide the res gestae
rule, the Montana court has persisted in the use of the general phrase,
res gestae, to express the concept of the litigated transaction. The object of this comment is to explore the application of Montana's res gestae
rule by comparing it with the general rule of other jurisdictions.
THE MONTANA RULE
SPONTANEOUS

DECLARATIONS

Spontaneous declarations are classic exceptions to the hearsay rule
and are easily described by a useful definition. Spontaneous declarations
are out-of-court statements, offered to prove the meaning contained
therein, which are substantially contemporaneous with the litigated
event, and which are originally inspired or caused by the excitement
and influence of the event before the declarant has had time to reflect,
contemplate, and possibly fabricate or prevaricate. 5 The basis of this
exception is the obvious trustworthiness of such declarations. Not only
do they have the advantage of not being distorted by the passage of
time, for they are made at the time of the event, but such declarations
are easily

accepted as true because

they are reports of what the

declarant has seen or heard. They are made as though the declarant's
mind is but a conduit through which the observed event is converted
into the spoken word. No element of intentional untruth has time,
theoretically, to be injected by the declarant. For example: While
in the midst of a bank robbery in which the bank teller has just been
shot, a bystander immediately declares to the killer: "You have just
murdered that man in cold blood!" The statement is admissible whether
offered through the testimony of the declarant or through the testimony
of any other witness who heard the declaration. Although, if offered
to prove malice, it is hearsay, courts believe this kind of hearsay is
competent and trustworthy because the declarant simply has had no
time to make up his own opinion or to lie.
Possibly because it is easiest of application and lends itself best
to analysis, the spontaneous declaration portion of the res gestae rule
has been most frequently used by the Montana court. Many cases 6 have
presented ideal factual situations for its application. They involve
statements made during a time period commencing with the litigated
act 7 and terminating about thirty minutes afterwards.' The court has
5See, MCCORMICK, supra note 1 at §§ 289 and 297; B. JONES, THE LAW oF EVIDENCE,

§ 10:1 (6th ed. 1972).
'Tanner v. Smith, 97 Mont. 229, 33 P.2d 547 (1934); Sellers v. Montana-Dakota
Power Co., 99 Mont. 39, 41 P.2d 44 (1935); Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 96 Mont. 254, 29 P.2d 1046 (1933) ; Koppang v. Sevier, 106 Mont. 79, 75 P.2d
790 (1937) ; Blevins v. Weaver Construction Co., 150 Mont. 158, 432 P.2d 378 (1967);

State v. Medicine Bull, 152 Mont. 34, 445 P.2d 916 (1968).
Tanner v. Smith, supra note 6.
'State v. Medicine Bull, supra note 6.
7
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been careful to point out, however, that the lapse of time after the
litigated act is not as important as whether the declarant was excited
by the event and compelled by its influence to speak spontaneously
about it without probability of fabrication. 9 By way of contrast, the
court has refused to apply the exception where the lapse of time after
the event has been inordinately long,' ° and where the statement, although apparently made sufficiently contemporaneously with the event,
was made by a person not speaking under its influence and excitement."
In still other cases the court has noted the offered hearsay statements
were not sufficiently connected with the litigated transaction so as to
come within the notion of "things done.' 2 Like other courts, the Montana court has at times carelessly applied the rule. In several cases it
has neglected either to mention the time lapse between the event and
the offered hearsay statement, or to analyze the offered testimony to
determine if its inherent trustworthiness is so great that it should be
admissible.' 3 It should also be noted that discretion may be exercised
in permitting what would otherwise be admissible spontaneous declarations. In at least one case the court has allowed the rather delicate
and inflammatory nature of the accusation (buggery of a young boy)
to tell against admission of a hearsay statement made soon after the
event, the court constricting the res gestae so as to prevent the statement
4
from being part of the litigated transaction.'
The best formulation of the spontaneous declaration part of the
res gestae exception the Montana court has given to date is found in
Callahan v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company: 15
[The] general rule is that the declarations must be substantially
contemporaneous with the litigated transaction and be the instinctive,

spontaneous utterances of the mind while under the active, immediate influence of the transaction, the circumstances precluding the
idea that the utterances are the result of reflection or design to
make false or self-serving declarations.
VERBAL ACTS

Verbal acts, although thought of as part of the res gestae, are not
logically an exception to the hearsay rule, for they are not even hearsay.
9

Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra note 6.
'ORossberg v. Montgomery Ward - Co., 110 Mont. 154, 99 P.2d 979 (1939), where a
statement made twenty days after the litigated act was held not part of the res gestae;
and Cook v. Rigney, 113 Mont. 198, 126 P.2d 325 (1942), where the court held that
a statement made three months after the litigated act but made sixteen years before
the commencement of litigation was not part of the res gestae.
"Poindexter & Orr Live Stock Company v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 33
Mont. 338, 83 P. 886 (1905).
"2Wilson v. Davis, 110 Mont. 356, 103 P.2d 149 (1940); State v. Fairburn, 135 Mont.
449, 340 P.2d 157 (1959).
"Hulse v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 47 Mont. 59, 130 P. 415 (1913); State v.
Le Due, 89 Mont. 545, 300 P. 919 (1931).
"State v. Shambo, 133 Mont. 305, 322 P.2d 657 (1958).
"Callahan v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, 47 Mont. 401, 133 P.
687, 689 (1913).
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A verbal act is a statement or communicative gesture accompanying
and explaining an otherwise ambiguous act. 16 It is different from a
spontaneous declaration in that (1) the former accompanies and explains an otherwise ambiguous act while the latter immediately follows
and is a reaction to an act not necessarily ambiguous; (2) a verbal act
is always made by the actor whereas a spontaneous declaration may
be made by a bystander; and (3) a verbal act is not offered to prove
the contents of the statement but rather to allow the substantive law to
attach certain consequences to the statement, whereas the spontaneous
declaration is offered to prove the truth of the contents of the declaration. 17 An example is apposite: Smith hands his watch to Jones saying,
"This is a gift." The act of handing Jones a watch without the attendant
statement is ambiguous, for Smith may have intended to establish a
bailment, a loan, or a gift; the accompanying statement, however, explains the act. The statement was made by the actor, Smith; had a
bystander made the statement, the act need not have been a gift, for
all the statement would then show is that the bystander assumed the
act to be a gift. Lastly, in the eyes of the law it would not matter
one whit if the statement were untrue, i.e., that Smith was lying, for
the law would attach certain consequences to this outward manifestation of intent regardless of Smith's real intent. Hence, the statement
is a verbal act.
Whereas the spontaneous declaration subdivision of the res gestae
rule boasts a plethora of Montana case law, the verbal act subdivision
has the distinction of having had no correct application and little development by the Montana supreme court. Several cases have given
the court the opportunity to discuss the verbal act doctrine, but the
court decided them under the spontaneous declaration idea instead.' 8

6
" See, WIGMORE,

supra note 2 at § 1772.
Catterall, 1es Gestae in Virginia, 21 VA. L. REV. 725, 737-738 (1935).
"Wilson v. Davis, supra note 12; Platts v. Platts, 134 Mont. 474, 334 P.2d 722 (1958).
There are, however, two verbal act cases in which the evidentiary question was correctly decided even though the right rule was not applied. In Territory of Montana
v. Campbell, 9 Mont. 16, 22 P. 121 (1889), the defendant was convicted of assault.
A dispute having arisen with a neighbor over the construction of a boundary fence,
the defendant and his hired hands confronted the neighbor. After a short and evidently fruitless parley, the defendant shouted, "Fire boys! '' and shot the neighbor
in the knee. This statement is clearly a verbal act: it is not a spontaneous reaction
to the neighbor's shooting; it was a deliberate statement by the actor indicating that
his operation of his rifle was not accidental; and it was not offered to prove he
ordered his hired hands to fire. For these reasons, the court should have ruled the
statement admissible as a verbal act and relevant, noting that it was not hearsay,
and therefore needing no application of the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.
In the second, Petition of Peterson, 155 Mont. 239, 467 P.2d 281 (1970), Peterson
and his partner had the bad luck to be caught by a witness red-handed in the act of
burgling a barn. While the partner did the dirty work, Peterson maintained a watch
outside. When the witness happened upon him and questioned him about his presence, all Peterson could do was lie obviously and unintelligently. At Peterson's
trial the prosecution offered his responses to the witness's questions when he caught
Peterson red-handed. The court cited Campbell at length and ruled the responses
were part of the res gestae. Again, these responses were really in the nature of
verbal acts: they were made by the actor deliberately at the time of the act in order
7See,
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Other cases have been decided as though they were verbal act cases
when in reality they were not.'
STATE OF MIND

The state of mind subdivision, like the spontaneous declaration, is
a true exception to the hearsay rule; but unlike a spontaneous declaration, a hearsay statement indicating state of mind is not always admitted because of its inherent trustworthiness. Rather, this is an instance
where the law of evidence has given way to the law of necessity. Because it is often necessary to prove an intent or motive element of an
act, and because even today's advanced sciences cannot divine a person's
intent or motive at any given time, it is necessary to accept either
conduct or personal statements to prove intent or motive. Nevertheless,
to come within the state of mind portion of the res gestae exception
to the hearsay rule, a statement indicating state of mind must be made
substantially contemporaneously with the litigated act, and it must tend
to show the actor's motivating state of mind at the time of the litigated
act. The landmark case in this area of the law is Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Hillmon,20 which held that declarations of a state of mind tending
to show a plan or intent to do an act, which is in the future with
regard to the declaration, are admissible as part of the res gestae. This
holding was limited in a later decision only to "declarations casting light
on the future" as distinguished from "declarations of memory, pointing
backwards to the past."21 For example, a day before a man is shot,
the killer states, "If I don't get him first, he's going to kill me." Although it is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted therein, the statement is admissible to establish a
defense, for it satisfies the two criteria set out above for the state
of mind, res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.
The state of mind portion of the res gestae exception has had a
haphazard application in Montana. The court is to be commended for
its clear and cogent application of the exception in Ross v. Industrial
Accident Board22 where it noted, in a decision whose logic is similar to
that of the Hillmon case, the facts indicated the disputed hearsay declarations cast light on an intent to do a future act. However, in another
state of mind case 23 the court gave no explanation of its use of the

to make it ambiguous, and they were offered to show Peterson was lying when he
made them. Again, the court should have ruled these statements were verbal acts
and not hearsay; therefore, they were admissible beause they were relevant; no
discussion of res gestae was necessary.
"'Callahan v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., supra note 15; Raish v.
Orchard Canal Co., 67 Mont. 140, 218 P. 655 (1923); Exchange State Bank v. Occident Elevator Co., 95 Mont. 78, 24 P.2d 126 (1933).
'Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1891).
'Shepard v. U.S., 290 U.S. 105, 106 (1933).
'Ross v. Industrial Accident Board, 106 Mont. 486, 80 P.2d 362 (1938).
'Simpson
v. Miller, 97 at
Mont.
328, 34 of
P.2d
528 (1934).
Published
by ScholarWorks
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res gestae exception. Even more objectionable has been the court's
approval of the state of mind exception as a rule of relevance for
determining whether evidence of other crimes-thus purportedly showing motive or intent-is admissible. 2 4 A recent case 25 gives cause to
hope for the logical application of this exception in Montana. There
the court refused offered state of mind hearsay testimony and looked
beyond the surface of the exception in search for the inherent trustworthiness of the offered hearsay. After having done so, the court
stated:
There is nothing in the circumstances surrounding the making of
the statement . . . which indicates that the defendant did not have

time to reflect, plan, and if it suited his purposes, prevaricate."

This last quotation reflects a caveat all students of evidence should
note. Most exceptions to the hearsay rule have been accorded their
status because their factual situations contain some factor which insures
their truthfulness. Naturally, when a factual situation is presented
which lends itself to the application of a hearsay exception, but which
does not contain the guarantees of trustworthiness typical of situations
the exception was designed to cover, then the exception should not be
applied, and the declaration should be rejected as pernicious hearsay.
EXPRESSIONS OF PHYSICAL CONDITION

Expressions of physical condition are also true exceptions to the
hearsay rule. These are usually expressions of pain or suffering contemporaneous with physical discomfort. Because the expression may be
viewed as being forced or driven out of the declarant by the pain or
suffering and not as a product of thought or design, it is generally
believed such expressions are inherently trustworthy in the same way
as are spontaneous declarations. 2 7 Unlike spontaneous declarations, however, expressions of a physical condition showing pain or suffering need
not be substantially contemporaneous with the litigated act; such expressions need only reflect the physical feelings present at the time of
the declaration.2 8 For example, where Tom's arm required amputation
after a traffic accident, but weeks later he complained of great lancinating pain coming apparently from the missing appendage, such complaints would be admissible. They are definitely hearsay, but because
they are motivated by the pain and suffering and not by thought,
design, or reflection, they are trustworthy. Also, note the complaints
followed the litigated act, the traffic accident, by several weeks. This
is one area of the res gestae exception where the notion of "things done"
can be stretched considerably beyond the litigated act.
21State v. Schlaps. 78 Mont. 560, 254 P. 858 (1972); State v. Russell, 93 Mont. 334,
18 P.2d 611 (1933).
25State v. Fairburn, 135 Mont. 449, 340 P.2d 157 (1959).
"Id. at 162.
2
JONES, supra note 5 at § 10:6.
"AId.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol34/iss2/4
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It cannot be said authoritatively that the Montana supreme court has
accepted the expressions of physical condition subdivision of the res
gestae exception, for the one case presenting an ideal opportunity for
so ruling failed to mention the phrase "res gestae" or even "transaction. '29 In that case the court called testimony relating the plaintiff's moaning and similar expressions of physical pain "original evidence ' 30 and ruled it admissible. Although this seems to be the only
case on this point in Montana law, it should be indicative of this jurisdiction's acceptance of the expressions of physical condition subdivision
31
of the res gestae exception.
IRRELEVANT FACTS INSEPARABLE FROM RELEVANT ONES

Another subdivision of the res gestae exception may be described
as admissible facts which, though irrelevant, are inseparable from the
relevant facts. Obviously, this so called subdivision of the res gestae
exception has nothing to do with the hearsay rule; rather it is an
exception to the relevance requirement of the general rule of admissibility. Like the state of mind exception, its justification lies in its necessity. Were it not for this exception it would often be impossible for a
party to present his case in a logical manner or prove its necessary elements because the irrelevant facts are so inseparably intertwined with
the relevant ones as to defy their severance. For example: The defendant kills three persons during the same murderous spree at the same
location, but he is tried for each crime separately. During his trial for
the first slaying, the clothing of his other victims is introduced, so
that by comparing angles of fire indicated by the bullet holes, it is
possible from all three bodies to calculate the position of the murderer
at the time of the shooting. Even though the clothing of the other
two victims is evidence of other crimes, evidence normally excluded
as irrelevant, the clothing is admissible because of its necessary position
32
in the presentation of the proof.
Rather than noting that the hearsay rule was not involved-therefore requiring no res gestae exception-the Montana court has applied
this part of the res gestae exception as a standard of relevance. These
cases involve admission of evidence of other crimes.3 3 In two, the prosecutions' cases could not have been presented in a clear and chronological manner if the admittedly irrelevant evidence of other crimes had
2

'Burles v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 49 Mont. 129, 140 P. 513 (1914).

11Id. at 515.

rAlthough not decided by the Montana supreme court, Northern Pacific Railroad Co.
v. Urlin, 15 S.Ct. 840 (1894), a case arising out of Montana, stretched the idea of
res gestae to include statements of aches and pains made by the plaintiff during
periodic examinations, some of which were up to two years after the litigated act.
"This example is drawn from the books. See, State v. Porter, 32 Or. 135, 49 P. 964
(1897).
"State v. Schlaps, supra note 24; State v. Russell, supra note 24; State v. Broadwater,
75 Mont.
350, 243 P. 587
(1926).
Published
by ScholarWorks
at University
of Montana, 1973
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not also been presented to the jury.3 4 The irrelevant evidence was a
necessary part to recounting the defendants' crimes. In the other case,
however, the court correctly recognized refusal of the offered testimony
in no way detracted from the story of the accused's offense; on the
contrary, its admission might have unjustly prejudiced the jury. 35
WORDS CONSTITUTING

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Words constituting circumstantial evidence have also been admitted
under the rubric of res gestae. In the usual situation, this subdivision
of the hearsay exception is invoked unnecessarily for the evidence sought
to be admitted is not hearsay. For example, in proceedings to declare
a person insane, it would be error to exclude as hearsay testimony that
the allegedly insane person often proclaimed himself to be king of the
United States. Such testimony is relevant in insanity proceedings and
certainly would not be admitted to prove that the allegely insane person
was in truth King of the United States; rather it is circumstantial
evidence tending to show he is insane. However, there are instances
when circumstantial evidence comes cloaked in hearsay. For example:
Mary contests the manner in which an administrator is prepared to
distribute an intestate decedent's property. She claims to be the decedent's wife; the administrator claims the decedent was never married. Mary seeks to introduce testimony that the deceased on several
public occasions referred to her as "Mrs." and that he often boasted
she was the mother of his children. Such declarations are circumstantial
evidence of a marriage, but they are also hearsay because they are
offered to prove the assertions they carry. There is no apparent reason
why such statements should be admissible under the res gestae exception.
All other exceptions have some kind of rationale behind them usually
explaining why they are inherently trustworthy. This one does not. 36
Perhaps of all the legitimate subdivisional exceptions to the hearsay
rule embodied by the phrase res gestae, the one including words constituting circumstantial evidence has been the one least analyzed and
most casually applied by the Montana court. It never recognizes, or
at least never states, it is admitting hearsay evidence under the res
gestae exception for the circumstantial, evidentiary value it may have.
Nonetheless, the Montana court has allowed circumstantial hearsay evidence where the declarations shed light on a couple's marital status, 3
where comments made by on-lookers during the execution of a contract
suggested one of the contracting parties was taking unfair advantage

4

" State v. Schlaps, supra note 24; State v. Russell, supra note 24.

'State v. Broadwater, supra note 33.
"It must be noted, however, at least one court in an attempt to insure trustworthiness
has required that such declarations be made in good faith. See, Reynold v. Adams,
125 Va. 295, 99 S.E. 695 (1919).
8

7Welch v. All Persons, 85 Mont. 114, 278 P.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol34/iss2/4
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of the other, 8 and where the offered hearsay statements indicated the
relationships between contracting parties. 39 Possibly seeking to insure
the trustworthiness of circumstantial hearsay evidence, a step jurisdictions following the general rule have not taken, the Montana supreme
court has required a contemporaneity between the litigated act and the
offered circumstantial hearsay evidence. 40 When not present, the court
has refused the offered hearsay.
WORDS INVOLVED IN THE PLEADINGS

The last occasionally mentioned subdivision of the res gestae exception is that which encompasses the words involved in the pleadings.
Usually, this area should not involve an exception to the hearsay rule,
for the words are not introduced to prove the truth of the meaning
they convey. A classic example is the case where the plaintiff has
alleged libel and slander by the defendant, and he seeks to prove his
allegations by introducing testimony of the torts. Obviously, this evidence is not hearsay. It is introduced only to show the torts were
committed; the plaintiff certainly does not wish to prove the alleged
libel and slander are true, for if he did he would thereby prove the
defendant's defense.
It is to the Montana supreme court's credit that it has never used
this subdivision citing the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. The
41
one Montana case illustrative of this principle is Jones v. Shannon.
There, the pleadings alleged mental distress, and the words which allegedly contributed to the distress the court called "part of the whole occur42
rence."
THE TRANSACTION ASPECT

As applied by the courts of most jurisdictions, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule is two-fold: (1) it attempts to delineate a set
of acts relevant to the litigated act by defining a completed transaction,
of which the litigated act is a part; and (2) if the evidence is hearsay,
it provides an exception to that rule of exclusion generally based on
the evidence's inherent trustworthiness. Although not a pure exception
to the hearsay rule, the Montana court has adhered to the rule in this
form. However, there is yet another important characteristic developed
by the Supreme Court of Montana: the transaction aspect. It is illustrated by the following cases.

'Stagg v. Stagg, 96 Mont. 573, 32 P.2d 856 (1934).
0Burns v. Smith, 21 Mont. 251, 53 P. 742 (1898).

See also, Northern Pacific Railway

Co. v. Kempton, 138 F. 992, 995 (9th Cir. 1905), where a federal court applying
Montana's law decided an employee's statements suggesting his employer's liability
were admissible as part of the res gestae.
"State v. Fairburn, supra note 25.
'Jones v. Shannon, 55 Mont. 225, 175 P, 6

(].918).

"Id. at 886.
Published
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Welch v. All Persons:43 This case involved a dispute among the
children of Hiram Rhodes, the plaintiffs contending they were the only
legitimate progeny, and the defendants asserting their legitimacy. The
plaintiffs sought to show the defendants were products of an illicit
union by introducing hearsay evidence of certain statements made by
the defendants' mother to the federal government asserting she had
never married Hiram Rhodes. The defendants alleged Rhodes and their
mother had been married for twenty-six years. The court held that
the res gestae, or the transaction in dispute, was the entire twenty-six
years of the alleged marriage; hence, any statements made during more
than a quarter of a century were admissible as part of the res gestae
if they shed light on the litigation.
Burns v. Smith: 44 In this case the plaintiff was suing to enforce
a contract made for her benefit between her mother and the deceased.
Its terms were that the mother would give up the plaintiff to the deceased's care and custody to be raised by him as his daughter in exchange for which the deceased promised to leave the plaintiff a daughter's share of his estate. The contract was made eleven years before
the deceased's death. The court held that the transaction or "the
res gestae extended over the entire time . . . [from] when the contract
' 45
Explainis alleged to have been made, to the death of the deceased.
ing, the court noted:
The conduct of the parties towards each other during that entire
time is part of the transaction, and whatever either party did or said
during that time which sheds light upon the matter, and aids in
disclosing the relations the parties sustained, and understood that
they sustained, 6 towards each other, must be considered as part of
the res gestae.'
Exchange State Bank v. Occident Elevator Co.:47 This case involved
the delivery of grain to an elevator company which paid for the grain
by check. The elevator company later discovered the grain was subject
to a prior valid security interest. Its agent, one Anderson, unsuccessfully
attempted to notify the company's bank to stop payment on the check;
he even stated to several individuals he had attempted to stop payment
on the check. When the plaintiff, by introducing the agent's hearsay
statements relating his attempt to stop payment on the check, sought to
disprove the elevator company's defense, one of a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice, the court noted that the statements were part
of the res gestae.
These cases indicate the Montana court has chosen to broadly define
the transaction aspect of the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.

"Welch v. All Persons, supra note 37.
"Burns v. Smith, supra note 39.

'-Iud. at 748.
"Id.
"Exchange State Bank v. Occident Elevator Company, supra note 19.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol34/iss2/4
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Rather than identify a marriage ceremony, the execution of a contract,
or the business deal of delivery and payment as the "things done," the
court has chosen the duration of the alleged marriage, the relationship
between the contracting parties from execution of the contract until
its completed performance, and the events and statements flowing out
of a business transaction. The expansiveness of the court's interpretation
in these cases, however, must be contrasted with its occasional constriction of the scope of the exception: a conversation held by witnesses
to the disputed execution of a will immediately after witnessing but
out of the presence of the testatrix was disallowed as not part of the
4
res gestae. 8
To a great extent it would seem the manner in which counsel are
able to define the transaction in dispute determines whether hearsay
evidence will be admissible as a part of the res gestae. If counsel must
litigate a dispute arising out of a sudden and unexpected act, and if
the facts force a reliance on the spontaneous declaration idea, the
apparent maximum time duration after the litigated act during which a
statement can qualify under this exception is probably thirty minutes."On the other hand, if the facts permit the res gestae to be framed in
terms other than a sudden and unexpected act, the court appears more
willing to extend the limits of the transaction. The duration of a marriage, 50 the relationship sustained between contracting parties,51 and
even a deceased's state of mind5 2 have been held to be parts of the
res gestae of their respective cases. This application of the doctrine is
well beyond its ordinary concepts even as broadly applied in the Occident Elevator case. Hence, it would seem the Montana lawyer may be
able to secure admission of what might otherwise be impermissible hearsay, if he composes his pleadings with the transaction aspect of the
Montana res gestae rule in mind.
THE

EFFECT OF STATUTES

There remains but one further area to discuss in relation to the
res gestae rule. This is the effect statutes have had on its development
in Montana. The Revised Codes of Montana 1947 (hereinafter R.C.M.
1947) set out three statutes which involve the idea of res gestae, or
"transaction" as it is therein named.13 Section 93-401-7, R.C.M. 1947,

4In re Williams' Estate, 50 Mont. 142, 145 P. 957 (1915).
"OSee, Callahan v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., supra note 15; State v.
Medicine Bull, supra note 6; Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra note 6.
"Welch v. All Persons, supra note 37.
'Burns v. Smith, supra note 39.
'Ross v. Industrial Accident Board, supra note 22.
'These three are R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-401-7 (Declarations which are a part of the
transaction. Where, also, the declaration, act, or omission forms a part of a trans-

action, which is itself the fact in dispute, or evidence of that fact, such declaration,
act, or omission is evidence, as part of the transaction.) ; 93-401-11 (When part of
part of an act, declaration,

the transaction proved, the whole is admissible. When
Published
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appears to be used most often in the cases as a make-weight factor
whenever the court is deciding whether a statement is part of the res
gestae ;54 indeed, this is to be expected, for §93-401-7 is but a statutory
declaration of the res gestae rule. Of more particular interest to the
practicing lawyer is §93-401-11, R.C.M. 1947, popularly known as the
"opening the door" doctrine. Its most startling use has been to admit
hearsay statements similar to those the court in the same case ruled
inadmissible as not part of the res gestae;55 the court's rationale was
that since one party had been allowed to introduce part of a hearsay
conversation, the other party had the right under §93-401-11 to introduce
the remainder of it. The same section has been used to justify the admission of the entire record of a former proceeding where the opposition
had previously introduced parts thereof.56 It also permitted one version
of a conversation where other versions had already been admitted by
the opposition.5 7 However, the use of §93-401-11 is not unlimited: the
additional evidence must be on the same subject as that introduced by
the opposition. s The opening-the-door doctrine has also been used (although §93-401-11 was not mentioned) to admit parts of correspondence59
and city ordinances where the opposition had previously introduced
portions thereof. 60
A

CRITIQUE

Montana's present rule on res gestae is the product of two main
forces. The first was codification in 1877 of what is presently §93-401-7,
R.C.M. 1947.61 The second has been the Montana supreme court's refusal
to subdivide the rule for analytical purposes. Both forces have worked
to preserve Montana's res gestae exception in much the same condition
as it existed in many jurisdictions during the mid-1800's.
This nineteenth-century exception to the hearsay rule has generated
much dissatisfaction. The commentators do not like it.62 The trend in

conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same
subject may be inquired into by the other; when a letter is read, the answer may
be given; and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given
in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, or writing, which is necessary
to make it understood, may also be given in evidence.); and 93-401-27(7). The last
mentioned section is but a repetition of the first, so henceforth no further mention
of it will be made in this comment.
"See, Burns v. Smith, supra note 39; Callahan v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., supra note 15; Ross v. Industrial Accident Board, supra note 22; and State
v. Seblaps, supra note 24.
"Hulse v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., supra note 13.
"Lehman & Co. v. Munger, 86 Mont. 553, 284 P. 769 (1930).
7McGonigle v. Prudential Insurance Co., 100 Mont. 203, 46 P.2d 687 (1935); Rasmussen v. Lee & Company, Inc., 104 Mont. 278, 66 P.2d 119 (1937).
"State v. Collett, 118 Mont. 473, 167 P.2d 584 (1946).
"Northwestern Electric Equipment Co. v. Leighton, 66 Mont. 529, 213 P. 1094 (1923).
"Varn v. Butte Electric Railway Co., 77 Mont. 124, 249 P. 1070 (1926).
"See the legislative history following R.C.M. 1947, § 93-401-7.
"E.g., WIGMORE, supra note 4; MCCORMICK, supra note 1 at § 288; J. Thayer, 15 Am.
L. REv. 5, 81 (1881), quoted in WIGMORE, supra note 2 at § 1767.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol34/iss2/4
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many jurisdictions to subdivide has been an attempt to escape the exception's pitfalls. And California, whose Code of Civil Procedure provided the source for §93-401-7, R.C.M. 1947,63 has repealed its statutory
res gestae exception and superseded it with sections which speak to
spontaneous declarations and contemporaneous statements. 4 As illustrated by this comment, Montana's exception does not escape the area
of general dissatisfaction.
The problem with res gestae is that courts can apply it as a standard
of relevance as well as an exception to the hearsay rule. Certainly, lontana's exception as it appears in §93-401-7, R.C.M. 1947, has encountered
this problem. 65 Furthermore, in many situations where res gestae is revoked it is used to decide an evidentiary question where another rule
of evidence better suited to the facts should have been applied. 6 Lastly,
67
it is vague and imprecise.
Because this misapplication of the exception is so widespread, one
cannot condemn a particiular court for its misuse; rather, any critic
should recognize that the fault lies with the res gestae exception itself.
A different formulation is needed to express the hearsay exception res
gestae was supposed to cover. Since the hearsay rule speaks to competence, any hearsay exception should speak to the inherent trustworthiness of the offered hearsay evidence. Hence, a better name might be
the trustworthy statement exception to the hearsay rule. This trustworthy statement exception should contemplate only spontaneous declarations, expressions of a state of mind, expressions of physical condition, and
words constituting circumstantial evidence. As a further ingredient, the ex63

See, the legislative history following R.C.M. 1947, § 93-401-7.
OSTAT. & AMEND. TO THE CODES OF CALIF., 1965, Ch. 299, §§ 1240, 1241, currently
reproduced in WEST'S ANNO. CALIF. CODES, Evidence, § 1240, 1241, respectively:
§ 1240: "Spontoneous statement. Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible
by the hearsay rule if the statement:
(a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived
by the declarant, and
(b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception."
§ 1241: "Contemporaneous statement. Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statment:
(a) Is offered to explain, qualify or make understandable conduct of the declarant; and
(b) Was made while the declarant was engaged in such conduct."
"E.g., in State v. McCracken, 93 Mont. 269, 18 P.2d 302 (1933), the defendant was
charged with horse stealing. During the trial testimony was introduced to show the
defendant had attempted to conceal the stolen horses by driving them down a remote
country lane. The court called testimony of the horses' route ''part of the res gestae.''
Id. at 303. The res gestae doctrine was invoked in this case where there was no question of hearsay testimony; it was applied strictly as a standard of relevance.
"E.g., in Raish v. Orchard Canal Co., 67 Mont. 140, 218 P. 655 (1923), the plaintiff
alleged the defendant's negligent maintenance of his headgate caused injury to the
plaintiff's lands. As evidence of the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff offered
hearsay statements made on an inspection tour shortly before the injury occurred by
one of the defendant's corporate directors. The court said the statements were not
part of the res gestae. It should not have mentioned res gestae, for the admissions
against interest exception to the hearsay rule more properly fit the facts.
at § 288. of Montana, 1973
67MCCoaMCK,
supra noteat1 University
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ception should include the transaction aspect as identified by the Supreme Court of Montana. At least such an exception would not inadvertently lend itself to application as a standard of relevance; moreover, it would not be a great departure from established Montana law.
CONCLUSION
Although res gestae should only be applied as an exception to the
exclusionary hearsay rule, many jurisdictions have used it as a standard
of relevance. The Montana supreme court recognizes the res gestae
exception as generally applied and misapplied, but it has chosen not to
specifically subdivide it as have other jurisdictions and the commentators. However, it has used the language of the subdivisions and applied
much of their rationale. It should be noted also that the Montana court
has shown no reluctance to define the scope of the transaction broadly
so as to include hearsay testimony which might otherwise be excluded
under usual applications of the res gestae exception. To take advantage
of the transaction aspect, however, counsel must be careful to frame the
issues in the pleadings so as to make the transaction in dispute encompass the needed hearsay statements. Even when the transaction cannot
be defined so broadly as to include desired hearsay testimony, it still
may be admissible under § 93-401-11 if the opposing party previously
introduces portions thereof. As a check on the admission of hearsay evidence, under the res gestae exception, admissibility is within sound legal
discretion of the trial court. 68

"See, Koppang v. Sevier, supra note 6; Blevins v. Weaver Construction Co., supra
405, 466 P.2d 589 (1970).

note 6; Gunderson v. Brewster, 154 Mont.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol34/iss2/4
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